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desirable result. Exact logic has given way to the realism of the business
community, and the individual taxpayers have been given a "fair break."
EDWARD D. TARLOW
Contributor
Taxation--Social Security Taxes—Application of Income Tax Regula-
tions.—S. S. Kresge, Inc. v. United States. 1—This action was brought by
Kresge for refund of taxes, assessed under the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, for the value of free meals
furnished by the employer-taxpayer to its fountain department employees. In
1954, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had ruled that the value of the
meals did not constitute wages in FICA and FUTA computations. Subse-
quently, in 1957, the Commissioner reversed this ruling in answer to an
inquiry by the taxpayer, based on the intermediate passage of Revenue
Ruling 57-471.2 HELD: Income tax regulations are not applicable to FICA
and FUTA computations, and even if they did apply, the taxes were properly
assessed here since the meals were not given to enable the employees to per-
form their duties better during their normal working hours.
Section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,9 regarding income
tax, reads:
there shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging furnished . . . for the convenience of the
employer, but only if—
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the busi-
ness premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept
such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a
condition of his employment. (Emphasis supplied.) ,
For meals to be excluded under subsection (1), all that is required is that
they be furnished on the employer's premises, and that the purpose served is
the convenience of the employer rather than the compensation of the em-
ployee.* The requirement of convenience has been deemed to be met when
puted as of the close of the taxable year ... )." (Emphasis supplied.) The court read the
words "as of to mean "as of one point in time"—the close of the taxable year. "Such
words las of] imply accrual...." Supra note 1, at 206.
1 218 F. Supp. 240 (ED. Mich. 1963).
2 Rev. Rul. 471, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 630.
Mt is the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service that the furnishing of such
meals is recognized as part of the general understanding of the parties to the em-
ployment contract, and that as a practical matter of value of such meals is gen-
erally regarded as part of the employees' remuneration.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 119.
4 Treas. Reg. § 1-119-1(a)-2 (1956).
Likewise, meals furnished will . . . be deemed to be for the convenience of the
employer if the furnished meals serve a business purpose of the employer other
than providing additional compensation to the employee.
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"the furnished meals serve a business purpose of the employer . . . ."8
There is no requirement that acceptance of the meal be obligatory rather than
optional on the part of the employee .°
The court in Kresge has attempted to read into section 119-1 the
requirement of obligatory acceptance by the employee which has been found
applicable only to section 119-2. The court's authority is Saunders v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 7 a case which arose not under section 119,
but under the then controlling section 120,8 which was a special provision for
police officers—petitioner Saunders being a New Jerky State Trooper. Refer-
ence is made also to Diamond v. Sturr9 and Boykin v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenuel° concerning lodging, an area which comes under section
119-2. The IRC itself states that before lodging is excludable, "the em-
ployee . . . [must be] required to accept such lodging . . . ."" Finally, the
court mentions Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Doak, 12 which concerns
meals and lodging, but is distinguishable on its facts, in that 'meals and
lodging would have been deductible had petitioners occupied the status of
employees."
The defendant suggests that authorization for the transposition of
"obligatory acceptance" is found in Mimeograph 5023 14 and states that
"the rule . . . [is applicable] only if the employee was required to accept
. . . . "15 (Emphasis supplied.) It should be noted, however, that the mimeo-
graph sets up only a suggested situation which will satisfy the convenience
test, and that it is not intended to be all inclusive. 1 ° This is supported by the
fact that nowhere in the Bulletin do the words "only if" appear.
It would seem, therefore, that neither the IRC nor the authorities cited
sanction the extension of the section 119-2 requirement, making lodging
obligatory and not optional, to section 119-1 regarding meals. The Internal
Revenue Regulations, in fact, seem to suggest the opposite."
Given this dubious application of law to the factual situation, the essen-
tial area of controversy which remains is whether income tax rules and
definitions are applicable to compute FICA and FUTA taxes. The controversy
5 Ibid. It is not questioned that under subsection (2), an additional requirement of
obligatory acceptance by the employee must be met in order to qualify for the exclusion.
• Treas. Reg. § 1-119-1(c)-2 (1956).
The mere fact that an employee ... may decline to , accept meals ... will not of
itself require inclusion of the value thereof in gross income.
• 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
§ Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 120. Repealed by 72 Stat. 1607 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 120
(1958).
9 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
10 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).
11 Supra note 3.
12 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
18 Id. at 707.
14 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 14.
As a general rule, the test of "convenience of the employer" is satisfied if . . .
meals are furnished to an employee who is required to accept such ... meals in
order to perform properly his duties.
15 Brief for Defendant, p. 18, S. S. Kresge, Inc. v. United States, supra note I.
16 Supra note 14.
17 Supra notes 4, 5.
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revolves around the construction of the term "wages," 18 the prime area
relating to the exclusionary provisions regulating non-cash items.
When comparing analogous statutes, the controlling factor has generally
been the relation of the structure and purpose of the legislation in question.'°
Analogous construction, known as the "in pad materia" doctrine, was recog-
nized in this area in Northern Pat. Ry. Co. v. United States, 2° where it was
held that, "the doctrine . . . is applicable when construing ... legislation
concerned with a specific subject such as ... taxes." 21 In applying the doctrine
to the present controversy, therefore, the problem should be considered from
the dual viewpoint of structure and purpose.
Some similarities are immediately evident among the statutes in question.
The term "wages" as used in the IRC, 22 and in the FICA and FUTA 23 are
similar. The exclusion from wages for accident and health plans are identical.'"
Finally, sections of the income tax provisions have been incorporated into
the FUTg. 25 It might be noted that all three taxes are part of the same
Internal Revenue Code, 2° are by nature revenue raising measures,27 are such
that their proceeds "are subject to appropriation like public monies gen-
erally,"28 and are not earmarked in any way. 2° A review of the administrative
regulations dealing with the exclusion of non-cash items from wages, either
under the social security or withholding provisions, will show the interrelated
treatment given them in the past.
In 1936 the convenience test was part of the "facilities and privileges"
exclusion applicable to FICA and FUTA taxes. Under the revenue provisions
of the Social Security Act, the Treasury Department had ruled that:
Ordinarily, facilities or privileges (such as entertainment, cafeterias,
restaurants, medical services, or so-called "courtesy" discounts on
purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to his employees
generally, are not considered as remuneration for services if such
facilities or privileges are offered or furnished by the employer
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Ii 3121(a) (FICA), 3306(b) (FUTA). 	 '
[T]he term "wages" means all remuneration for employment, including the cash
value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash .. . .
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, * 3401 (Withholding).
[ -Me term "wages" means all remuneration . . . for services performed by
an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash .
It should be noted that these sections, representing the legislation in question, are
identical in substance.
78 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286-88 (1933); Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 756 (1937).
20 156 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 248 (1947).
21 Id. at 350.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3306.
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 105, 3306(b) (2).
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3306(3)(5) incorporates by reference Int. Rev. Code
of 1954 H 401(a), 501(a).
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 1, 3101, 3301.
27 U.S. Const. art. I, * 8.
28 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).
28 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574 (1934).
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merely as a convenience to the employer or as a means of promoting
the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of his employees. 3°
The following year the convenience test took on a dual capacity, for in addi-
tion to being merely a test of non-remuneration, it was set out as an absolute
rule of exclusion.3 ' This extension came as a result of a previous ruling which
stated that meals would constitute compensation in the instance of two em-
ployees performing the same job where there was a great difference in pay
scales: one employee receiving less pay due to the furnishing of a meal by
the employer.32 Based upon this same ruling, the "facilities or privileges"
clause was amended 33 so that the current regulations provide that,
Nile term "facilities or privileges," however, does not ordinarily
include the value of meals . . . furnished . . . since generally these
items constitute an appreciable part of the total remuneration of
such employees'" (Emphasis supplied.)
The government's interpretation limited the amended version 35 to situations
in which the value of the meal did not involve a substantial amount of the
total remuneration, while confirming the absolute character of the con-
venience rule as a valid exclusion in the same area. 36 To clear up this apparent
contradiction the Commissioner in 1944 declared the "convenience" rule in-
applicable to FICA and FUTA computations. 37 It would appear that the
inapplicability of the rule went only to its absolute character and not to its
use as an auxiliary of the "facilities or privileges" clause. This contention
seems plausible for in 1954 the convenience test was again held inapplicable
as it is used in income tax computations, i.e., as an absolute exclusionary
testis The Commissioner's issuance of the private ruling to Kresge further
strengthens this position, since in light of the denial of the application of the
rule in the same year," the basis of the ruling cannot be employer con-
venience as an absolute, but rather it must be convenience as regarding the
"facilities or privileges" clause of which it has been a part for almost a
decade.
This process of piecemeal change and modification was taken a step
further in 1962 when a ruling was issued, stating the test to be whether the
value of the meal is an appreciable part of the total remuneration. It was
3° Treas. Reg. 106, § 402.227 (1936).
31 S.S.T. 302, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 456. This ruling emphasized that without regard
to whether the meals were an appreciable part of the total remuneration, the "value of
lunches ... to . . . employees does not constitute wages within . . . the Social Security
Act."
32 S.S.T. 321, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 323.
as S.S.T. 386, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 211.
34 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-1(f) (1940). It should be noted that all that is done by
this amendment is to reemphasize that the meals will only be excluded under the "facili-
ties or privileges" clause if their value is not a substantial part of the total remuneration.
sa Ibid.
36 Supra notes 14 and 31.
37 Mim. 5657, 1944 Cum, Bull. 550. It is to be noted that no distinction between
the test as part of the "facilities or privileges" clause and as an absolute exclusionary
test is considered. It is suggested that this failure is the source of the present confusion.
38 Rev. Rul. 54-593, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 30.
sa Ibid.
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declared that the value of one meal per day would be considered appreciable
without any regard to its actual value." It should be noted that this ruling
reiterates the "facilities or privileges" test but adds a definitive treatment
of the word "appreciable," which addition is unacceptable in light of the
nature of the test it modifies. The basis of the test had been a mathematical
proportion between the value of the meal and the total remuneration to the
employee. The new addition is set in absolute terms without any regard to
the proportional amounts involved. This is self-contradictory and irrational
on its face. Is the test one of factual computation or is it an absolute? It
would appear that it cannot be both.
The court based the inapplicability of comparing income tax regulations
to social security taxes on the differing inherent natures of the taxes. It
concluded: "it is possible that what might not be taxable as wages for income
tax purposes might constitute wages under the Social Security Act.""
(Emphasis supplied.) This would seem to be a rather non-committal state-
ment and hardly any authority on which to base a broad policy decision -. The
"might" language regarding the nature of the taxes is dicta" and its specula-
tive nature causes it to fall short of the position of confidence given it in the
present opinion. It would appear that a difference in the uses to which the
various taxes are to be put is not a valid basis on which to deny any inter-
relation of definitions, especially where the revenue raised goes into a common
fund with all other taxes." In its opinion, the court has attempted to anal-
ogize FICA and FUTA with the Fair Labor Standards Act—an analogy
between taxing and non-taxing statutes. However, it would appear that an
analogy between taxing statutes, as is suggested here, would be somewhat less
strained."
Though due regard must be given to the opinion of the Commissioner,
it has been held that any doubtfulness in a tax act is to be decided in favor
of the taxpayer." It is obvious from the preceding outline of the administra-
tive regulations that doubt is present in this area.
With the economic considerations involved and the inconsistency and
confusion evolving from the administrative handling, of this subsection in
recent rulings, the court had an excellent opportunity to clarify the state of
the law. Rather than a mere pronouncement of its ruling, the court might
better have filled the need for a thorough analysis of the problem by handing
down an opinion which assessed the authority on both sides and which left
no question as to its basis for the decision. PETER J. NORTON
40 Rev. Rul. 62-150, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 213.
41 Pacific American Fisheries v. United States, 138 F.2d 464, 465 (9th Cir. 1943).
42 The court found that the meals and lodging, based on the evidence, were a means
used to provide additional compensation which alone is sufficient to bar the exclusion,
even in its absolute form.
43 Regarding the lack of importance of the manner in which monies derived are
expended, cf. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) ; California
v. Anglim, 129 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 669 (1942).
44 The attempt here is to establish that these statutes are similar, though not
identical, and therefore that there does appear to be a rational basis for construing
them analogously.
45 United States V. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179 (1923).
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